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FOR RElEASE ON DELIVERY OF SPEECH SENATOR MANSFJELD (D. 110NTANA) 
THE BRICKER AHENDMENT: THE GEOO.GE SUBSTITUTE : EXECUTIVE ACREEMENTS 
YiT . President : 
I have not participated extensively in the debate on the Bricker 
Amendment since much of the debate has been of a legal nature. In these 
matters I yield to those who are much more erudite in constitutional theory 
and precedent than Io 
Sitting on the sidelines, ho~ever , I cannot help but feel that we 
are talking round and round the real issue becuvse we are talking about too 
many issues . Thanks to the many learned expositions which have been made 
on the floor of the Senate these past few weeks, I have come to the conclusion 
that we are discussing not one question but four questions. All of these, to 
be sure, revolve around a fundamental issue: the division of power among the 
several brc..nches of goverament in respect to our :relations with other nations . 
But each question has its own ramifications and needs to be considered 
separately if the fundamental issue is to be clearly understood. So long 
as they are lumped together, the confusion can only deepen. 
The Bricker Amendment, in its original form, as I understand it, 
would bring about a drastic and four- sided reshuffling in the ratio of 
power among the several branches of government. In effect, it would shift 
power over foreign relations away from the Senate and the Executive . At 
the same time it would enhance the po~er of the House of Representatives 
and the 48 individual stcte governments in matters effecting our foreign 
relations . 
The first of the fou= questions that we are really discussing, 
then, is whether to reduce the power of the Senate in the field of 
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foreig~ relations relative to the other branche~ of government . Is 
there a mer::ber of this body who believes that the Senate has been so 
inco~petent in the performance of its constitutio~al duties that it 
ought to be relieved of these responsibilities , even in part? I 
speak now of the Senate through 160 years of history, not any 
part~cular Senate. Has its record been so shaceful, so inadequate thet 
the Senate of the 83rd Congress ought to go on record as bdnging 
about a fundamental change in its role in A•rJn ' can government? I , 
for one , do not believe that this is so and J doubt thnt any other 
member of the Senate so believes. 
The second of the four questions before us is whether or 
not to increaze the power of the House of Representatives in the 
field of foreign relations . I have heard no demands from the House 
for such an increaseo This proposed amendment orig:inated in the 
Senate, not in the House. With all due respect for the great 
capacities of the other body in which I was privileged to sit for a 
decade, I "'ould not for ce this added responsibility on it. The 
House already has unique r esponsibilities in the field of appropria-
tions. They are necessary; they are just as valid as the Senate's 
unique rol e in foreign relations. And I would change neither . 
The third question which we are discussing is whether or not 
to project revolutionary responsibilities in the field of foreign 
relations on the 48 state governments . Except for those who would 
turn the clock back, not half e century, not even a century, but 160 
years or more , this question hardly merits debate . The state governments 
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themselves rejected a role in foreign relations when the Constitution 
was accepted. They provided instead for Senators to protect the 
interests of the states in the Senate. Both the Senior Senator and 
the Junior Senator from Montana were elected to safeguard the interests 
of Montana within the broad framework of the national interest. Those 
interests include any that may be at stake in our foreign relations . 
We will do our best to protect them. 1 am sure that other Senators 
will do the same for their states and that t:!~ r are fully qualified to 
do so. 
If it is neither a desire to reduce the prywer of the Senate 
nor to increase the power of the House or the state governments , what 
then is really at issue in this debate'? There mnst certainly be a 
real issue or the Senate would hardly spend weeks in debate of this 
proposed amendment. 
There is a real issue and it has troubled me deeply as I am 
sure it has troubled other Senators. It is to be found in the fourth 
of the questions which are under discussion here: the power of the 
Executive Branch in the field of foreign policy. 
The Constitution specifically provides the President wl th 
certain unique powers to conduct our foreign relations , just as the 
other branches of government have unique powers in other matterso I 
do not question those powers which accrue to him as Commander-in-Chief 
of the armed forces . 
But in one aspect of our foreign relations , the treaty-making 
power , he does not have unique, but rather concurrent , power shared with 
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the Senate . Treaties are to be made by the President only with tle 
.,dvice ond consent of the Seuo te . Tho most vi tal mat ters invoh•in{; 
the relationships of this country with others are or should te 
conducted within this realm of conc~rent po~er. 
But it is prec..:.sely in this real.'ll that an extra- co:lstitu-
tional device , the executive a~reement, now threatens the f ne lalance 
of power which has been m:tintained \.J1•1 ,: ~· our system of rovein."1cnt for 
a cent\TY .!I1d a l alf . 
It will be argued, 1S it ~as been , that executive aerec~ents 
are used almost cxch .. sively in pt..rst.ance of authority delec;o.ted by 
Congress or to " .1plement cert::lin valid underta!<ings gro~;ing out of the 
unique powers of the President. Thot is true and I t~1in1': the device , 
so used , is necessary and useful and har.nles., to the principle of 
balance of powers. 
But it is not in the nass o~ executive agreements that the 
issue is to be fo~d. It is , r ather , in the few, in the very few . 
For it. is in the few , the very few , that this extra- cor.stitutional 
device can be t.Sed to stretch the unique po\vers of the Fxecutive . It 
is in the feu that there lies the danger of usur'1a~; 0.1 , des true· ion 
of the constitutional balance , anc. in the last analysis , ... he threat 
of executive tyranny. 
This is no imaginary fenr uhi.ch hann ts me and other nembers 
of the Senate . Executive ~(;reements have been used to stretch the 
powers of the Presidency and unless safeGuards are e~tahlinhed tLere 
is no rea~on to believe that they will not continue to te ~o used . 
If the Senate '-.rill be·1r witl me for 'l few moments longer , 1 •1::.11 
undertake to prove by specific example hoH this eytra-constitutional 
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device can u."lder:n:ine the po~.fer of the Senate in foreign relations . I will 
endeavor to show row this device can and l:as been used to erode tLat pol-ler 
and transfer it painlessly, almost imperceptibly, from this body to the 
Executive Branch . 
For decades , t reaties of friendchip , commerce and navie;~tion 1.ave 
been mace Hith other countries by the President \>Tith the advice and 
consent of the Senate . As the Senators knol.r , these are basic treaties 
which establish the frame'I-Iork of our relatb.•f• \!i th other countries. 
The Senate has traditionally given advice ~"ld c~nsent to such treaties . 
It still does so , for the most part. 
In 1933, however , the Department of State negotiated an arreement 
of friendship and commerce \·lith Saudi- Arabia . lis far as I can determine , 
this was the first time an executive agreement , rather than a tre1.ty , 
was used for this purpose . To be sure , the aproement \>lith Saudi- Arabia 
was labelled provisional in nature and was to remain in effect, I quote: 
"until the entry in force of a definitive treaty of co::unerce and navi-
gation. " Even thoue;h it \.ras temporary, ho\-Tever , the State Department 
must have knotm that this executive agreement was treading on dangerous 
cons t:i tutional ground for it added the followinz clause , I qt·.ote: 
"Should the government of the United States of America be prevented by 
future action of its legislature from carryinG out the terms of these 
stipulations the oblibations thereof shall thereupon lapse ." 
This executive asreement uas nc7rr replaced by a definitive treaty 
of friendship, commerce and navir;at:l.on. Thour;h the Senate has never 
given consent to ratification, it stands in equal force \>lith e;enuine 
treaties dealing with tLe same subject matter , to which the Senate 
has given approval. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 21, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 6-
1 his "'Prcem(lnt, {~ . :'re3idcnt, estubHshed ~ precedent . Note no·.r 
hc'.l the preccc"ent is rcen.:orced. Thi~·teen years l<.~ter , in 191.6, U:e 
Ste"Ce i)ep::Lrt:nent negotiated a s.:milar ac:;recr.1er.t with ti.e Kincdo~ o!' 
~e"'ten . The terms of the -c1.-.•o agrec:::-.ents we.re prc.ctically identical eJ·cep 
for tHo Or.J.;ssion:::: . The a~ree;r.ent llith Yemen no longer carried the phrs .. e 
indicating that it was to remain in effect only, I quote: 111llltiJ th€ 
entry in force of a definitive treaty of co•~r =-~ ca ru1d navigation . 11 
Also o:n: tted \o'as the p:hrase , I quo• e : "Sl.o··ld l.he governr.:cnt of tl'e 
United States of America be pre·.;ented by future action of its legislature 
from carryinc out the terms of these stipulations the oblig~tions thereof 
shall thereupon lapse . 11 
In short , the State Department appears , in 13 years , to !.ave 
reached the conclt.sion that the poHer to na(e trea+ies of frier.dsl .ip, 
co::nmerce and r."7igation had beco:ne , at least in some cases , "' unique 
po'l-ler of the E:; ecutive Br anc!1, that the consent of the Senate \-IUS no 
lonGer necessary, at lec.st in sone of these agreements . 
One'year Jater , in 1947, a third acreet'lent of friendship , com:..nerce 
~d navication uas nego+.iated 'lith tl:e Kinc;do!n of l'ep'll. In printin" 
the t6Kr of this abreement in its Bulletin , ~he State Department 
apparently still had a b·lin£:1.:! of nervousness about the procedvre it ·.tn.s 
followine . It was constrained to point to b..ro precedents. That 
wer e the precedents? The t<..·ree~.r 1.n t.i. vernon and Sa•.di-Ar:.bi~l. 
Yemen, Saudi-Arabia and . 1epal. ':'hese ere small , farauay lands. 
Few of us cotJ.c locate them quickly on a '1ap . Still fewer ho.ve any 
direct concern with what transpires in them. Yet. , tl~e giT~f!nt::; 
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which h"'ve been net;oti'lted with theL constitt.te a series of prece..:ents 
\-lhich ic of vital i:nportance to ot:r constitutional division of po..,Jers. 
"one o~ t"lem has ever been replaced by a regtlar tJ · a.+y , yet all of 
them cover subject matter 'Hhich traditionally has been hal"ldlec by 
trea7.y. 
Twenty- one years have elapsed since the first of these three agree-
ments \-las negotiated. \-!as the fail\!l'e to rc~l u;e the egree!.1ents by 
permanent treaty an oversirht or a consciot•s e'CTlansion of the uniqte 
po'l-!ers of the Execiltive at t'.e expense of the Senate? I3 this example 
a stra\.,r man or a very real c1.se of usurpation of power? 1rill the 
President now se::::d thece three .1greements or t'-leir perr.anent replace-
~ents to the Senate for advice or consent or after years and decaees 
is t~e need still for temporary agree~ents? 
!~0\-1 is the Senate to deal with the disc..ppearance of i~s preroga~ 'ves 
in this fashion? By abdication to the House or to the 41 states or by 
cripplin~ the capactty of the President in t:~e field of foreicn 
relations? In each ccse , the remedy wo~d be far worse ttan the 
cure . The 'Ulsuer for the Senr1te is to deal uith the real area of 
d'U'lg,:.r and that area a l one., J.'he ansHer is to take only those p:re-
cautions Hhich are necessary to prevent a burca'lcratic abuse of th~.s 
extra- constitutional cle'Tice , the executive acreement . 
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